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This paper uses a model with transaction costs and imperfect competition in the land market 
to analyze the efficiency and welfare effects of land reforms. We show that removing only 
one imperfection may have very different efficiency and welfare effects than would otherwise 
result from reforms that reduce both imperfections. In extreme cases, partial reforms can 
actually lead to welfare losses. The welfare effects are affected by the size of transaction 
costs, relative farm productivity and farm land demand elasticities. Partial reforms also have 
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Land Reform and Productivity Gains with Multiple Market 
Imperfections 
 
Pavel Ciaian  
 
Introduction  
Land reform and the creation of optimal land institutions has attracted renewed 
attention because of its importance in transition processes such as in China, Vietnam, South 
Africa, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe and because of new political pressure 
for land reforms in countries with highly unequal land distributions such as Zimbabwe and 
Brazil.   
Land markets are an important instrument to enhance efficiency and reduce poverty – 
which is often concentrated in rural areas (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1993; Deininger 
and Feder 2000).  However, land markets – as rural markets in general – often do not work 
well in developing and transition countries.  For example, Carter and Salgado (2001) 
emphasize the impact of credit constraints, Yao (2000) labor market imperfections, and 
Skoufias (1995) the effect of land transaction costs, and Vranken and Swinnen (2006) several 
factor market imperfections to explain the land market imperfections in developing and 
transition countries.  In an environment with uncertainties, transaction costs, weak property 
rights, imperfect credit, insurance, and output markets, land markets do not function 
efficiently: for example, sales are typically thin and limited to distress sales, and renting is 
segregated (Platteau, 2000; Macours, 2006). Therefore policy implications from these studies 
have focused on reforms to improve property rights, reduce transaction costs etc. to remove 
market imperfections and stimulate productivity growth.     
However, an important assumption of all these studies is perfect competition in land 
markets.  This is not realistic in many regions where land use is dominated by large farms, 
such as, for example, in Latin American countries like Brazil and in African countries like   4
Zimbabwe and South Africa. Similarly, in several transition countries large corporate farms 
use a large share of agricultural land.  For example, they use more than 80% in countries such 
as Belarus, Slovakia, and Russia and more than 50 % in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
1 They are, on average, around 500 to 1000 hectares in these 
countries, but in Kazakhstan and Russia some farming companies use more than 100,000 
hectares.
2  
The interaction of imperfect competition and transaction costs has a strong impact on  
the efficiency of the land market, and on land prices and payments. In several transition 
countries there is a large gap in rental prices between land used by corporate farms and land 
used by individual farms. Table 2 shows how in the Czech Republic and Slovakia land rents 
paid by corporate farms are generally much lower: most vary between 70% and 20% of the 
rents paid by family farms.  Further, in several countries, corporate farms are more likely to 
pay their rents in kind, while family farms are more likely to pay cash or mixed cash/in-kind 
(Swinnen and Vranken, 2005).  
Some even argue that the domination of large farms, and the associated imperfect 
competition in the land market, may grow in the future. An important question is whether the 
land reforms and liberalized land markets will contribute to a (re-)concentration of land.   
While the evidence on this effect is mixed and limited (see e.g. Deininger and Jin (2003) for a 
review), Lerman, Csaki, and Feder (2004) point out that in an environment characterized by 
asymmetric access to information, capital, and legal means of enforcement - a situation 
typical in transition economies re-concentration - may be a realistic outcome.   
                                                 
1  Based on national statistical sources (see also table 1).  
 
2 Large scale corporate farms continue to use large parts of the land because of a variety of reasons. However, an 
important reason is that historically, the large-scale farms were the users of the land and transaction costs 
constrain the shift of land to new farms (Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998). New owners of the land face significant 
transaction costs if they want to withdraw their land from the farms and reallocate it. Transaction costs include 
costs involved in bargaining with the farm management, in obtaining information on land and tenure 
regulations, in implementing the delineation of the land and dealing with inheritance and co-owners (Bloch, 
2002; Prosterman and Rolfes 1999) – see also further. 
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The objective of this paper is to explicitly model imperfect competition in the land 
market and to analyze the efficiency and welfare effects of reforms which reduce transaction 
costs. We show that the efficiency gains from transaction cost reductions are mitigated, and 
can even be offset. To show these effects, we use a model which incorporates features which 
are consistent with the land market situation in transition countries where large farms remain 
important. However, the analysis and figures in this paper are relevant as well for other parts 
of the world with unequal land use, such as in Latin America or Africa. 
The analysis in this paper is related to studies on second best polices and policy 
effects in the presence of distortion (see e.g. Aronsson and Blomquist, 2003; Blackorby, 
Davidson, and Schworm, 1991; Boadway and Harris, 1977; Milner, 1992 in general and 
Alston, Edwards, and Freebairn, 1988; Murphy, Furtan, and Schmitz, 1993 in agricultural 
policies). Our paper is, to our knowledge, the first to analyze these issues in the context of 
land markets and reforms.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a model of imperfect 
competition and transaction costs in land markets.
3   We derive the equilibrium land 
allocations, income distributions, and welfare losses under various combinations of market 
imperfections. Then, we analyze how reductions in the market imperfections, for example by 
reform-induced reductions in transaction costs, affects efficiency and welfare.  
 
                                                 
3 The traditional literature on rental markets typically focuses on sharecropping or on the relationship between 
large landlords and small tenants (Bravermman and Stiglitz, 1982; Bardhan, 1989).  While these assumptions 
are relevant for parts of the developing world, they do not capture essential characteristics of land rental markets 
in transition countries (or other parts of the developing world), which are characterized by dispersed 
landownership among many rural and urban households and where small farms compete for access to land with 
large-scale corporate farms (Lerman et al., 2004; Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998; Tillack and Schulze, 1999).  
Transition countries provide a unique opportunity to study the development of land markets as land reforms 
have reallocated property rights and liberalized land exchange restrictions.  The land reform process has created 
a class of new, sometimes absentee, land owners while land is used by a mixture of smaller individual farms and 
large-scale corporate farms – with large variations across (Lerman, Csaki, and Feder 2004; Rozelle and Swinnen 
2004; Curtiss, et. al 2006;  Brandt et al. 2002; Deininger and Jin, 2003). 
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The Model 
4  
Before transition, effective land rights were in the hands of the state, or the collective 
farms.  Land was used by large-scale state and collective farms.
5 Land reform in the early 
1990s reallocated most land property rights to individual households, sometimes employed in 
agriculture or sometimes not.  We will refer to them as “landowners”.  Land reform took 
several forms.  In East Europe land was often restituted to former owners, elsewhere land was 
given in plots to rural households, or under the form of shares to farm workers (Lerman, 
Csaki and Feder; Rozelle and Swinnen).   
  More or less simultaneous with the land reform important farm restructuring took 
place.  Farm restructuring included a privatization of the farms and a restructuring of the 
management structure. This restructuring included a reorganization of collective and state 
farms into private cooperatives and farming companies.  We will refer to them as “corporate 
farms”, which are typically large-scale. The most dramatic restructuring was the break-up of 
collective and state farms into household plots and family farms. We will refer to these as 
“individual farms”.   
  To keep the analysis tractable we will model these developments in a stylized way.  
First, consider a situation where all the land is now owned by individual households, but still 
used by the corporate farms.  (This reflects a situation where the land reform is formally 
completed, and the farms have been privatized, but no restructuring to individual farms has 
occurred.)   
  Second, we assume that land transactions take place exclusively through rental 
agreements. This closely reflects reality since recent study shows that the majority of land 
                                                 
4 The model is based on Ciaian and Swinnen (2006), who applied the model to analyze how transaction costs 
and imperfect competition in the land market affect distributional effects of agricultural subsidies in the New 
Eastern Member States of the European Union. In this paper we use the model to analyze the efficiency and 
welfare effects of reforms which try to reduce transaction costs and/or imperfect competition in the land market.  
 
5 The exceptions to this rule were Poland and the countries of former Yugoslavia, where land use and ownership 
remained in small private farms during the Communist system. 
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transactions in transition countries is through rental agreements; particularly corporate farms 
rent more than 90% of the land they use (Swinnen and Vranken, 2005).
6  Landowners receive 
a rent r for each unit of land that they rent to corporate farms.   
  Several households, landowners or not, consider starting up an individual farm for 
which they need land.  They can either withdraw land from corporate farms or rent from 
landowners who currently rent their land to corporate farms.  In both cases the price they 
have to pay per unit of land is the sum of the rent paid by the corporate farms, r, (explicitly 
for rented land or implicitly as opportunity costs) and the transaction costs, t, involved in 
withdrawing the land from the corporate farms.   
 
Transaction costs 
Transaction costs in land exchange can be very substantial in transition countries.  
When a landowner wants to withdraw land from the CF there are several reasons why 
transaction costs may arise in this process. These include: bargaining costs, costs of enforcing 
right of withdrawal, and costs related to asymmetric information, co-ownership, unclear 
boundary definition and costs related to unknown owners.  First, while the withdrawal 
procedure is usually stipulated by law, it is also determined by the willingness of the CF to 
implement it (Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998; Bloch, 2002). For example, in Slovakia the CF has 
the right to give a plot of land to owners located in a different place than the one specified in 
the ownership title (based on former boundaries) if the plot affects the integrity of the CF's 
land operation. The landowner gets only usage right to this new plot while s/he keeps the 
ownership right to the original plot located in former boundaries. This asymmetry obviously 
increases the costs for the landowner, since s/he can be deterred from withdrawal by being 
offered a plot located far from his operation or the plot may be of lower soil quality. The laws 
                                                 
6 Also for developing countries, recent studies have recently re-emphasized the role of land rental markets as 
important for providing access to land for the poor and as an efficiency-enhancing institution in environments 
characterized by large uncertainties, such as countries in transition (de Janvry et al., 2001; Sadoulet, de Janvry, 
and Davis 2001).   8
in Bulgaria, Slovenia and Hungary contained similar transaction cost increasing features (see 
Bojnec and Swinnen 1997; Mathijs 1997; Prosterman and Rolfes 1999; Swain 1999).   
Second, CF managers typically have more information than landowners about the 
economic situation of farm and about regulations governing local land transactions.
7 This is 
especially the case for landowners who have not been involved in agriculture, or are living 
outside the village where their land is located, or are pensioners (Swain).
8  
  Third, other transaction costs follow from co-ownership of land, unclear boundary 
definition, and the problem of unknown owners. In many Transition countries, land was 
never formally nationalized during the Communist regime, although effective property rights 
on land were controlled by the regime and the collective farms.  Hence, legal ownership of 
land remained private (Swinnen, 1999). However, land ownership registrations were poorly 
maintained, if at all, and in many areas land consolidation was implemented, wiping out old 
boundaries and relocating natural identification points (such as old roads and small rivers).  
The loss of information on registration and boundaries produced a large number of unknown 
owners in some transition countries (Dale and Baldwin 1999). In addition, unsettled land 
inheritance within families during the socialist regime caused a strong land ownership 
fragmentation and a large number of co-owners per a plot of land. For example, according to 
OECD (1997), in 1993 approximately 9.6 million plots were registered in Slovakia, which is 
0.45 hectares per plot, and each plot was owned by on average 12 to 15 people. As Dale and 
Baldwin put it, “a single field of twenty hectares may have hundreds of co-owners”. In the 
Czech Republic, there were 4 million ownership papers registered in 1998 for 13 million 
parcels, with an average parcel size of 0.4 hectares. In Bulgaria, a recent study found that 
50% of the plots were co-owned, often by several people (Vranken, Noev, and Swinnen 
                                                 
7 For example, Swain describes how pensioner-members of co-operatives in Slovakia were “forced” to rent the 
land to the co-operative by being threatened of losing their pension. 
 
8 In Hungary "passive owners" (this include village-based pensioners, landowners that are not active in the co-
operatives and those living outside of the village where their land is located) received around 71% of 
agricultural land (Swain 1999).    9
2004).  The average number of co-owners was more than two (excluding husband and wife 
co-ownership).  Some co-owners may be unknown, or may not be in the country, or may be 
scattered all over the country.  This raises the costs of land withdrawal as land withdrawal 
from the CF normally requires agreement from co-owners. The study indeed finds that co-
owned plots of land in Bulgaria are more likely to be used by corporate farms.  
Finally, other costs related to land transfers include notary fees, taxes and other 
administrative charges. For instance, the studies on Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania, 
estimate these costs between 10% and 30% of the value of the land transaction (OECD, 2000; 
Prosterman and Rolfes 1999; World Bank, 2001).  
To model these transaction costs, we need to distinguish between transaction costs 
which are specific to the plot, to the owner, and to the user.  Transaction costs will depend on 
the distribution of land among households and farms, on individual characteristics of 
landowners, and on the fragmentation of the land. To reduce these dimensions we assume 
that initially all plots of one owner are used by one corporate farm.
9  Define 
j G  as the 
transaction costs specific to the relationship between owner j and the corporate farm. These 
costs can be due to asymmetric information and bargaining. Define as the 
ij g  transaction 
costs specific to plot i of owner j. Transaction costs may differ per plot due to the number of 
co-owners or boundary uncertainty.   
We can now derive the transaction costs per unit of land, 
ij t , as a function of these 











t + =  
where
ij a is the size of plot i and 
j A  total land owned by owner j with  ∑ =
i
ij j a A .  
                                                 
9 This assumption is realistic giving the regional organization of the CFs and also consistent with the further 
modeling approach using one representative CF.   10
First, it follows from (1) that fragmentation of land ownership increases the per unit 
transaction costs. This is reflected in the first term of equation (1). Ceteris paribus, with 
fragmentation the plot size will be smaller and hence the transaction costs per plot higher. 
This increases transaction costs per unit of land:  0 < ∂ ∂
ij ij a t  with 
j A  fixed. 
  Second, when land ownership is distributed unequally among households, transaction 
costs increase with the amount of land withdrawn from corporate farms.  The reason is that 
part of the transaction costs 
j G  are fixed per owner.  Hence, ceteris paribus, larger owners 
will have lower per unit land transaction costs, and will be withdrawing land first.  Smaller 
owners of land have larger transaction costs per unit of land and hence the premium that IF 
have to pay to access the land of small land owners will need to be larger.   
  Third, transaction costs per unit of land will be constant if land ownership is 
distributed equally ( A A
j =  for all j) and homogenously (the plot size distribution is the same 
for all landowners), and if landowners and plots do not vary in other characteristics. In this 
case  g g
ij = ,  G G
j =  and  a a







t + =  
where n is the number of plots per landowner. Fragmentation affects the level of t but not the 
distribution.  
In reality, land ownership is fragmented and relatively egalitarian in many transition 
countries.  The egalitarian distribution is due to a combination of factors (Swinnen 1999). In 
many Transition countries the Communist regimes immediately after World War II, and prior 
to collectivization, implemented radical land reforms, taking away land from large land 
owners, religious institutions and groups that had supported the pro-Nazi regime, distributing 
it among small tenants, landless people, and pro-communist groups.  In other countries, 
further egalitarian land reforms were implemented during collectivization; and in yet other   11
regions, more in southern Europe, the Ottoman empire had left a very egalitarian land 
ownership structure. Land restitution restored, and in fact reinforced, these egalitarian land 
distributions.  In those countries where restitution was not widely implemented (Slovenia and 
Poland) or mixed with other land reform procedures (Hungary and Romania), land ownership 
is also relatively equally distributed. This implies that fixed transaction costs per unit could 
be a reasonable approximation of reality in many transition regions.   
To analyze the impact of the market imperfections on welfare and productivity, define 
the incomes of the three groups in the economy as follows:  
(3)  ()
I I I I A t r A pf + − = ∏ ) ( ,  
(4) 
C C C C rA A pf − = ∏ ) ( , 
(5) 
T L rA = ∏ , 
where 
I ∏  is IF profits, 
C ∏  is CF profits, 
L ∏  is landowners’ income, p is output price, A
I  is 
amount of land rented by the IF, A
C  is land rented by the CF, A
T is total land,  (.)
I f  is IF 
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.   
Total welfare (W) is the sum of the incomes of the three groups in the economy as given in 
equations (3), (4) and (5). 
(6) 
L C I W ∏ + ∏ + ∏ =  
 
The equilibrium with perfect competition 
The land decision-making problem of a profit-maximizing individual farm (IF) is 
then: 
(7) Max 
I I I I A t r A pf ) ( ) ( + − = ∏    12
The first order condition for optimal land use is: 












The optimal level of land rented is where the marginal value product of land, represented by 
the left hand side of (8), equals the IF’s marginal cost of land, r + t.  The marginal cost is the 
rental rate an IF has to pay to a landowner, and which equals the corporate farm rental rate (r) 
plus the transaction costs per unit of land (t).  Condition (8) defines the demand for land of 
the individual farm.  Aggregating this over all (potential) IFs yields the total demand for land 
by individual farms, D
I.  Total IF demand for land is represented in figure 1 by D
I for zero 
transaction costs (t=0) and Dt1
I and Dt2
I for transaction costs, t1 and t2, respectively, with t2 > 
t1 > 0.  The horizontal axis in figure 1 represents the amount of land, with A
I = A
T - A
C.  The 
vertical axis measures land rental price.  
  For reasons of exposition, consider first that corporate farms are also price takers in 
the land market (we will relax this assumption soon). The land decision-making problem of 
CF is maximization of profit function given in equation (4). The first order condition for 











The optimum is where land marginal value product equals land market rent. Equation (9) 
represents CF land demand given by D
C in figure 1. When there are no transaction costs the 
equilibrium in the land market is at (A
*, r
*).  The land used by the CF equals A
* and the land 
used by the IF is A
T - A
*.  




*) for transaction 
costs  t1 and t2, respectively.  It is obvious from figure 1 (and appendix A1) that with 
increasing transaction costs, the share of land used by corporate farms is higher and the rent 
they pay is lower.  Transaction costs allow CF to use more land and at lower costs.   Their 
gains are equal to area B for transaction costs t2.   13
Only the CF benefit from these reduced rents.  The rental price for IFs is the CF price 
plus transaction costs.  The rental price for IFs increases with increasing transaction costs: 
from r
* to rt1
*+ t1 and rt2
*+ t2,  for transaction costs t1 and t2, respectively.  The losses of IFs 
are equal to area EF for transaction costs t2.  Landowners also lose because their income from 
land rents declines: without transaction costs they receive r
* per unit of land; with transaction 
costs t2 they only get rt2
* (which equals the rental rate of corporate farms and the net per unit 
payments from IFs after covering transaction costs).  Their losses are equal to area BCD for 
transaction costs t2. The net aggregate welfare losses with t2 are equal to area EFCD with FD 
measuring the total transaction costs and area EC, measuring the deadweight costs of the 
induced economic distortions. (see appendix A1)  
 
Imperfect competition 
Corporate farms are not price takers in the land rental market in many regions.  For 
example, in countries such as Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan, among others, where they occupy more than 80% of the land (see table 1), CF 
have important market power.
10  To model this, assume that there is one (representative) CF 
which recognizes that its land rental decisions will influence the land rental price.  The CF is 
not a monopolist since there is a group of (potential) individual farms who are price takers in 
the rental market.  The IFs will rent land up to the point where their demand equals their 
rental price (ie. r+t).  The CF will take the rental actions of the IFs into account:  it will adjust 
its land renting to maximize profit subject to the behavior of the IFs.   
  In this situation, the objective function of the corporate farm is the following:  
(10)   Max 
C C C C C A A r A pf ) ( ) ( − = ∏  
where ) (
C A r  is the rental rate as a function of A
C and the rest of variables are defined as 
above.  
                                                 
10 Even in countries where their average share is lower, there may be imperfect competition in certain regions.   14

















    
where A
M is the optimal land allocation of the CF.  The left hand side of condition (11) 
represents the marginal benefits, i.e. the marginal value product of land, and the right hand 
side is the marginal cost of land for the CF.  The marginal cost of land includes both the 
rental rate and changes in the rental rate when the CF rents in more or less land.  The CF 
chooses its land rent where the marginal cost equals the marginal benefits.  Graphically, this 
can be represented as in figure 2.  For simplicity, we assume for a moment that there are no 
transaction costs (t = 0).  MC
C represents the marginal cost function of land renting for the 
CF.
11  The equilibrium land use by the corporate farm is where MC
C equals D
C, ie at A
M.  The 
resulting CF rental price is r
M.   
Compared to the competitive market equilibrium (A
*,  r
*), the domination of the 
market by the CF leads to a reduction of land use by the CF (A
M < A
*), and a corresponding 
increase of land use by the individual farms.  The land rental price is lower for all farms (r
M < 
r
*).  The surplus gains of the CF are area B – C (>0).  The IFs also gain, by area EGJ.  The 
losses are for the landowners who lose rental income equal to area BDEGJ.  The effect on 
rural households depends to what extent they are employed by the CF, or are IFs, or 
landowner.  For rural households who are both landowner and individual farmer, the losses in 
rental income may outweigh the gains in farm profits from lower rental prices.   Finally, the 
total welfare effects are negative.  Social costs due to the market power of the CF equals area 
CD.   
  
                                                 
11 The shape of the marginal cost function is basically determined by the elasticity of individual farmers land 
demand. Since the total land demand is fixed, when the CF rents an additional hectare of land, it must pay a 
higher rent, the one that IF are willing to offer (the first term on right hand side of the equation (11)), plus the 
increase of rent for every hectare of land rented (the second term on the right hand side of equation (11)). The 
more inelastic the IF land demand is, the higher is this increase in rent and consequently the steeper the MC
C is.   15
Efficient land allocation with multiple market imperfections  
As shown in the previous section, each of these markets imperfections distorts the 
economy and shifts the land allocation away from its social optimum, i.e. its efficient use. 
However, when both imperfections are present, the results is more complex. The formal 
analysis of the combined effects is in Appendix 2. Here we will discuss the effects based on 
the graphical analysis in figure 2. 
With both imperfect competition and transaction costs t, the equilibrium is at (At
M, 
rt
M). The CF rental price falls further to rt
M < r
M < r*: both the transaction costs and the 
market power of CF push the CF rental price down.   
For the corporate farm and for landowners both market imperfections reinforce each 
other: The combination of imperfect competition and transaction costs results in extra 
benefits for the CF. Relative to the competitive equilibrium without transaction costs (A
*, r
*), 
the surplus gains of the CF equals area BDEK. Landowners lose twice as both factors put a 
downward pressure on rental prices. Their combined loss equals area BDEGJKL.  
However, for individual farms the two market imperfections have opposite effects. IFs 
gain from lower rental prices and having more land due to  imperfect competition, but lose 
because of higher rental prices and having less land due to transaction costs. The net effect 
depends on the relative size of the transaction costs. With relatively low transaction costs, the 
benefits from CF market power will dominate. With relatively high transaction costs (as is the 
case in figure 2), the losses due to transaction cost will dominate. The net loss for IFs is equal 
to area FH
 12  (see also appendix A2).  
The effect of the two market imperfections are also opposite in terms of land 
allocation. To illustrate this, consider the special case shown in figure 3. We denote t
* as the 
level of transaction costs for which the CF marginal cost curve (MCt*
C) crosses the 
                                                 
12 Notice that if transaction costs would be such that the marginal cost function MCt
C would go through point 
(A
*, r
*) that both effects would exactly offset each other and the combined impact on IF welfare would be zero. 
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equilibrium with perfect competition and no transaction costs (A
*,  r
*). With perfect 
competition and transaction costs t











*. However, with imperfect competition and t
* the land allocation 




M. There are no land allocation distortions with the 
combination of t
* and imperfect competition.
13 Transaction costs smaller than t
* and 
imperfect competition would imply that the equilibrium will be to the left of the competitive 
equilibrium. In this case IF rent more land than the socially optimal level. With transaction 
costs larger than t
* the equilibrium is to the right of the competitive equilibrium. IF rent less 
land than the socially optimal level.  
However, it is important to point out that, while the allocation of land with the 
combination of imperfections equals the optimal allocation, the total welfare effects are 
always negative (for a formal proof see appendix A2 part b). In figure 2 compared to the 




M) implies losses equivalent to – HJL –FG, 
where HJL represents the total transaction costs incurred and FG the market distortions. For 
the special case in figure 3, there are no land allocation distortions. Only land market rent is 
affected, rt*
M < r
*. For this reason landowners lose relative to perfect competition and zero 
transaction costs equilibrium. Their loses equal to DEFGHJK. A part of this loses are 
transferred to CF, equal to area DEFHJ. The rest, area GK, are transaction costs. IF welfare is 
not affected. But social welfare is negatively affected: the net welfare effect is negative equal 
to area GK. 
 
Effects of reforms: reduction of transaction costs and more competition 
Institutional and economic reforms can lead to increased competition and reduced 
transaction costs. For example, in European transition countries which joined the EU, the 
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legal and institutional reforms which were required as part of the EU accession process 
improve the legal and institutional framework in which land transactions occur. At the same 
time, reforms which enhance profitability and productivity of the farms, for example through 
stimulating foreign investment in the processing sector, will also stimulate land transactions 
and thereby improve experience, transparency, and understanding of the market, all reducing 
transaction costs.   
 
Productivity and total welfare increase 
  Imperfect competition and transaction costs t (for 
* t t ≠ ) create a wedge between the 




A pf pf ≠ .
14 Depending on the level of 
t, either the marginal value product of the IFs is larger than the marginal value product of the 
CFs or the marginal value product of the CFs is larger than the marginal value product of the 
IFs.
15 In any case a more efficient land allocation can be found where land productivity is 
higher.  
The removal of both market imperfections stimulates land transactions leading to a 
reallocation of land from farms with smaller marginal value products to farms with higher 
marginal value products, up to the point where the marginal value products are equalized. 
The reduction of transaction costs reduces IF rental costs and thus increases their land rental 




A pf pf > , IF can now offer a higher rent and outcompete CF and this leads to an increase 




A pf pf < , then 
more competition and less transaction costs will increase CF renting and reduce IF renting. 
Now CF can offer a higher rent than IF and therefore their land renting increases. The 
equilibrium after the reform is at the point where there are no more profitable land 
                                                 





A pf pf = . 
 
15 This follows from FOC with imperfect competition and transaction costs given by equations (8) and (A2.1).   18




A pf pf = .
16  

































A pf A A pf
A















= γ  implying 
that: 











A pf A A pf
A









> = γ γ .  
















= γ .  
The output effect is shown in figure 4. The equilibrium with imperfect competition 
and transaction costs t2 (where t2>t
*) is (At2
M,  rt2




A pf pf > . The reform which reduces transaction costs t2 to zero and imposes perfect 
competition shifts the equilibrium to (A
*, r





CF land renting declines: (A
* < At2
M). Inversely, if before the reform transaction costs t0 are 
smaller than t
* (t0 < t
*), the equilibrium is (At0
M, rt0




A pf pf < . IF rent 




*. The reform shifts the 
equilibrium to (A
*, r








In both cases (with t0 and t2) output increases. With transaction costs t2 IF output gain 
is given by area MNOPQR while CF output loss is given by area OPQR. As a result, total 
                                                 
16 For the special case when t=t
*  land reallocation will not take place because marginal products are equal 




A pf pf = , and no farm can offer a higher rate. The only effect will be an increase in 
land market rent.  
 
17 This follows from the reverse of the proof shown in appendix A2 part b.   19
output increases by area MN. With transaction costs t0 the total output increases by area FG 




The reform that simultaneously removes transaction costs and eliminates imperfect 
competition has significant income implications for the farms and landowners. Most 
obviously, reforms which eliminate CF market power reduces CF profits.
19 At the same time 
the removal of transaction costs increases land competition from IF leading to an increase in 
the market rent and further decreasing CF profits. This is illustrated in figure 4. The 
equilibrium before the reform is (At2
M, rt2
M) for transaction costs t2. The reform shifts the 
equilibrium to (A
*, r
*) and CF pay a higher rent (r
*>rt2
M) and rent less land (A
* < At2
M). Their 
profits are reduced by area DEGHJKOPQ.  
Both the removal of transaction costs and the elimination of imperfect competition 
increase market rent. As a result, landowners gain from the reform.
 20 The rent, as shown in 
figure 4 for transaction costs t2, increases from rt2
M to r
*. The landowners gains are equal to 
area DEGHJKOPQNUVY. 
The effect of the reform on IF depends on the size of initial transaction costs.
21 First, 
consider the case when initial transaction costs equal t2, where t2>t
* (figure 4). Reforms 
which reduce transaction costs t2 to zero and impose perfect competition create gains to IF. 
Without transaction costs the IF rental costs decrease. They can offer higher rent and rent 
more land. On the other hand, competition decreases IF land renting and increases the rent, 
because with the elimination of imperfect competition CF no longer push down land rent to 
                                                 
18 With fixed land supply land productivity also increases. 
 
19 This follows from the proof shown in appendix A2 part b. Because CF gained from market imperfections, 
then they must lose from removing them. 
 
20 This follows from the proof shown in appendix A2 part b. Because landowners lost from market 
imperfections, then they must gain from removing them. 
 
21 This follows from the proof shown in appendix A2 part b. If IF lost from market imperfections, then they 
must gain from removing them. If IF gain from market imperfections, then they must lose from removing them.   20
maximize profits. The transaction costs effect is stronger than the market imperfection effect. 




M), and their rental costs 
decrease (r
*<rt2
M+t2) leading to net gains for IF equal to area MS. 
However, if initial transaction costs are lower then t
*, such as with t0 in figure 4 where 
t0 < t
*, IF lose with reforms. The equilibrium with imperfect competition and transaction costs 
t0 is (At0
M, rt0
M).  Now after the reform the first effect (the transaction costs effect) is smaller 





M) and the IF rental costs rise (r
*>rt0
M+t0). As a result, IF lose area 
HONU. 
 
The effect of partial reform (reduction of transaction costs but imperfect competition) 
In reality, transaction costs seem to be falling in many countries. In contrast, large 
corporate farms persist and continue to dominate the land market (table 1). In fact, in several 
countries a re-concentration has occurred recently.  For example in Russia and Kazakhstan 
huge farming companies, often using more than 100,000 hectares of land have emerged since 
1998 (Swinnen, 2005). The welfare and output effects can be quite different in this situation 
compared to the reform effects analyzed in the previous section.  
 
Productivity and welfare may increase or may decrease with partial reform 
The output and welfare effect of partial reform depend on the size of initial transaction 
costs. To show this, assume first that initial transaction costs are smaller than t
*. To earn 
monopoly profits, CF push the land market rent down by reducing renting. This shifts the 
renting equilibrium to (A
M, r
M) (figure 3). In equilibrium CF rent less land than the socially 
optimal level. However, transaction costs increase CF renting. Transaction costs smaller than 
or equal to t
* shift the CF renting closer to (A
*, r
*). In the special case when transaction costs 
are equal to t






   21
In this case, a reform which reduces transaction costs but which keeps imperfect 
competition unchanged moves the land allocation equilibrium away from the efficient land 
allocation, (A
*, r
*). IF can rent more land with reduced transaction costs because their rental 
costs decline with the reform. However, CF still affect the land market rent. They adjust their 
renting: to earn monopoly profits they decrease renting because of stronger competition from 
IF. Marginally more productive CF use less land. For example, with the reduction of 
transaction costs from t









* (figure 3). Hence, with 
partial reform a new less efficient land allocation is achieved.  
Figure 3 illustrates the effects. CF production declines by area BEFJL. IF use more 
land so their production increases by area FJL. The total production effect is output loss equal 
to area BE.
22 Area BE is actually a monopoly loss caused by a distortion of the monopolistic 
behavior of CF with transaction costs zero. This monopoly loss is the maximum possible 
output loss of restructuring. On the other hand, because transaction costs are reduced to zero, 
positive welfare gains are realized equal to area GK.  The transaction costs gains, area GK, 
plus the output loss, area BE, implies that the direction of change of total welfare could be 
negative or positive depending on which area is larger. (This result is formally derived in 
appendix A3 part a). 
Now consider the alternative case that initial transaction costs t2 are larger than t
* (t2 > 
t
*). The equilibrium with t2 and imperfect competition is given by (At2
M, rt2
M). This is shown 
in figure 5. The reform that reduces transaction costs by Δt = │t
* - t2│ or by a smaller amount 
but keeps imperfect competition shifts the land allocation equilibrium closer to the 
competitive land allocation equilibrium (A
*), and the restructuring will be accompanied with 
output increase. For example, the reduction of transaction costs t2 to t1 (t
* < t1 < t2) shifts the 
equilibrium to (At1
M, rt1
M). The restructuring results in reallocation of land from less to more 
                                                 
22 Land productivity declines too, see appendix A3 part b.   22
efficient users. The CF renting declines while renting of IF increases. CF produce less by area 
FGH, and IF produce more by area DEFGH. The total production effect is output gain equal 
to area DE. Because of the reduction of transaction costs there is a welfare gain equal to area 
KL. However, IF use more land by At2
M – At1
M. For this land transaction costs are incurred 
because the land must be withdrawn from the CF. These losses equal area EF. Hence, the 
total net welfare effect is equal to the output effect (gain in area DE) plus the transaction costs 
effect (gain in area KL minus loss in area EF), i.e. area DKL – F.  
With further reduction of transaction costs (for Δt >│  t
* – t2│), the effect on 
productivity is ambiguous. The land allocation equilibrium moves beyond the competitive 
land allocation equilibrium (A
*). Consider the case when transaction costs t2 are reduced to 
zero. This is shown in figure 7. The total output effect can be split in two parts. First, the 
reduction of transaction costs to t
* results in output gains equal to area C. Second, for the 
reduction of transaction costs from t
* to zero ( Δt = │0 - t
*│) the output effect is negative and 
is equivalent to area B in figure 7 (which is equal to area BE in figure 3). 
The combined output effect of transaction costs reduction from t2 to zero, is output 
change equal to area C – B (figure 7). The sign of the net total output effect depends on the 
magnitudes of the two areas
23 (see appendix A3 part a for a formal derivation). 
The total welfare effect is equal to the output effect (area C – B) plus the transaction 
costs gains (area DK) (figure 7). The net effect on welfare with partial reform can be positive 
or negative (see also appendix A3 part a). 
In summary, we have shown that the effect of partial reform can lead to welfare gains 
or losses. The later may result because removing one imperfection while keeping the other 
one may cause an inefficient allocation of resources. Removing transaction costs increases 
total welfare. However, if the market power of CF is maintained, this leads to a misallocation 
                                                 
23 The same holds for land productivity. See appendix A3 part b.   23
of land resources and the total effect of reform may result in lower welfare and land 
productivity. 
 
CF lose, while IF and landowners gain from partial reform 
  Partial reform, which removes transaction costs but keeps imperfect competition, also 
has important income distributional effects. Beneficiaries are IF and landowners, while CF 
lose (see proof in appendix A2 part a). The removal of transaction costs benefit IF. Their 
rental costs decline and they can compete for more land. In equilibrium their renting increases 
and the rental costs that they pay decline. Consider transaction costs t2 in figure 7. With the 








t2 + t2) and they rent more land (A
T – A
M > A
T – A t2
M) Their profits increase by area 
CDEF.  
CF lose from the partial reform. With the reduction of transaction costs, land 
withdrawal is cheaper for IF. In equilibrium CF renting is lower and the rent they pay is 
higher. In the case shown in figure 7 after the reform the CF rent increases from rt2
M to r
M, 
while CF renting declines from A t2
M to A
M. CF losses equal area BEFGHJ.  
Landowners gain. Stronger competition between IF and CF due to reduced transaction 
costs pushes the market rent up. The rent increases from rt2
M to r
M and the landowners’ gains 
equal area GHJK. 
 
Factors affecting the impacts: Land demand elasticities and relative farm productivity 
As shown above, with partial reform, the reduction of transaction costs may increase 
output (such as area DE in figure 6 for the reduction of transaction costs from t2 to t
*), while 
other reductions in transaction costs may reduce output (such as area BE in figure 3 for the 
reduction of transaction costs from t
* to 0). The total welfare change is crucially dependent on 
the sizes of these output effects, because the total welfare change additionally to gains   24
obtained from transaction costs reduction also depends on the output change.  
As discussed above, one important factor that affects the size of these output effects is 
the level of transaction costs. Two other relevant factors are land demand elasticities and 
relative farm productivity. 
 
Land demand elasticities 
Land demand elasticity measures the size of the adjustment in farms’ land rental 
demand when land rent changes. If CF land demand elasticity is high any land rent 
adjustment induces large changes in CF land renting, while if CF land elasticity is small any 
land rent adjustment induces small changes in CF land renting. In other words, with small 
land demand elasticity the CF land marginal product value (or the rent that CF is willing offer 
to landowners) changes greatly with respect to a change in land renting. The reverse holds for 
high elasticity.  
When the CF has market power it adjust land renting to equalize its land marginal 
value product with marginal costs (equation(11)) and not with the market rent as in the case 
of perfect competition (equation (9)). With high (low) CF elasticity the land adjustment from 
the competitive equilibrium to imperfect competition equilibrium is higher (smaller). This 
implies high land allocation distortions with high CF land demand elasticity and small land 
allocation distortions with small CF land demand elasticity. As shown in figure 3 the partial 
reform that removes transaction costs t





The land allocation distortions that arises because of CF market power is, equal to A
* – A
M 
and increases with CF land demand elasticity. This implies that the output loss of the partial 
reform, given by area BE, also increases with the CF elasticity. Similarly, when there is an 
output gain (such as area DE in figure 6 for the reduction of transaction costs from t2 to t
*) 
with partial reform, everything else equal, the higher the CF elasticity, the higher the output 
gain.    25
The IF land demand elasticity also affects the outcomes. The potential output loss that 
a partial reform can induce decreases with the IF elasticity. If partial reform reduces 
transaction costs t
* to zero but keeps imperfect competition, the land allocation equilibrium 
shifts from A
* to A
M (figure 3). The smaller the IF elasticity is, the higher land allocation 
distortion are, and A
M is moved further away from A
*. This implies a higher output loss as 
given by area BE. Similarly, (potential) output gains of partial reform increase with the IF 
elasticity. For example if transaction costs t2 are reduced to t
* the land allocation with partial 
reform shifts from At2
M to A
* (figure 6). Land allocation distortions decrease with IF 
elasticity. This implies that with high IF elasticity the land allocation equilibrium with 
imperfect competition and t2, At2
M, is closer to the equilibrium with perfect competition and 
t2, At2
*, but further away from the equilibrium without market imperfections A
*. This implies 
that the output gain given by area DE increases with IF elasticity.   
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the impact of elasticities on output changes with reforms 
based on simulation results.
24 Figure 8 shows the output loss (such as given by area BE in 
figure 3 with the reduction of t
* to 0 with partial reform) for different IF and CF land demand 
elasticities. Everything else equal, the output losses increase with the CF land demand 
elasticity and decreases with the IF land demand elasticity. Figure 9 shows simulation results 
for output gains with partial reform (such as given by area DE in figure 6 for the reduction of 
transaction costs from t2 to t
*). The output gains are larger with larger CF and IF elasticities. 
  In summary, it is more likely that partial reform leads to net output loss and hence to 
total welfare loss when the IF elasticity is small. CF market power causes larger land 
allocation distortions with smaller IF demand elasticity. Hence, the output loss which can 
arise from partial reform increases, while the output gain decreases with smaller IF elasticity.  
In the case of CF elasticity, the pattern in total output change and total welfare change is not 
                                                 
24 The simulations are not based on real data from a transition country. The CF and IF land demands are 
assumed to be linear. Total agricultural land is assumed to be equal to 100 hectares and transaction costs are 
assumed to be constant ( 0 = ∂ ∂
I A t ).   26
clear, because both output loss and output gain that can arise from a partial reform move in 
the same direction with the CF land demand elasticity. 
 
Relative farm productivity  
Another factor that affects the outcome is the relative productivity of the farms. This 
is shown in figure 10. Assume initial CF demand as given by D1
C. The equilibrium with 
transaction costs t and imperfect competition is (A1t
M, r1t
M). If CF productivity increases, its 
land demand shifts upwards.
25 The CF demand shifts from D1
C to D2
C and the equilibrium 
shifts to (A2t
M, r2t
M). CF rent more land in equilibrium, A2t
M > A1t
M. With low CF productivity 




M), while with higher CF land 




M). Distortions in 





The reform then induces higher output loss the more productive CF are.
 26  In figure 10 this 
output loss is given by areas B1 and B2, respectively for low and high CF relative 
productivity. It is clear that where area B2 is larger than area B1. 
                                                 
25 Higher CF productivity implies that CF can produce more from the same input. Total production increases for 
any amount of land they rent.  This implies that for any area they rent, say A
T  ( ) ( )
T C T C A pf A pf 1 2 > , where 
C f2  represents production function with higher productivity as compared to production function 
C f1 . Define 














Every thing else equal, the CF productivity relative to IF is higher with  ( )
T C A pf2  than with ( )












A pf 1 2 > . 
 
26 In monopsony, CF equalize the land marginal value product with marginal cost as given by equation (11). 
With perfect competition the optimal CF renting decision is were land marginal product value is equal to land 
market rent given by equation (9).  With higher CF productivity CF renting, 
M A , increases. This implies that 
the second term on the right hand side of equation (11) also increases with CF productivity. Compared to perfect 
competition equilibrium, then with market power CF must decrease more land renting with high productivity 















This implies that land distortions increase with CF land productivity.   27
Inversely, similar logic applies to output gain as given by the areas C in figure 10. The 
output gain is lower with higher CF productivity. This output gain occurs if initial transaction 
costs t, larger than t
* (t>t
*), are reduced to t
*. With higher CF productivity the land allocation 
distortions are smaller and hence smaller output gains are obtained from the reform which 
reduces the transaction costs t to t
*. 
There are also gains in reduced transaction costs. These gains decrease with CF 
productivity. With low relative CF productivity, transaction costs gains equal area EF, while 
with higher CF efficiency, transaction costs gains equal area DF, where area EF > area DF.  
Figure 11 summarizes simulations results for these effects. The horizontal axis shows 
relative CF productivity. The vertical axis shows the three effects as graphically shown in 
figure 10 (area B, area C and transaction costs gains as shown in figure 10) and the net 
welfare effect (net welfare = area C + transaction costs gains - area B). All results are 
represented as the share of total production. 
In summary, it is more likely that partial reform will cause net output loss and hence 
net welfare loss the higher CF land productivity is relative to IF. This is because land 
allocation distortions are more likely to increase after the partial reform the higher CF relative 
land productivity is. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper used a model with transaction costs and imperfect competition in the land 
market to analyze the efficiency and welfare effects of reforms which reduce transaction costs 
as large farms continue to dominate the land market. The implications are important. The 
results show that the continuation of imperfect competition mitigates efficiency gains and 
welfare benefits that would otherwise result from reforms that reduce transaction costs. In 
extreme cases, partial reforms can actually lead to welfare losses. Removing one imperfection 
while keeping the other one may cause an inefficient allocation of resources. When removing   28
transaction costs, total welfare increases. However, if market power of CF is maintained, this 
leads to a misallocation of land resources and the total effect of reform may result in lower 
welfare and land productivity. These welfare effects are strongly affected by the size of 
transaction costs, relative farm productivity and farm land demand elasticities.  
Partial reforms also have important income distribution effects. IF gain because their 
rental costs decline due to a reduction in transaction costs. CF lose because of higher rents 
and stronger competition from IF. Higher land market rents lead to gains to landowners.    29
Appendix 
 
A1. Perfect competition and welfare effect of transaction costs 



















L C I W ∏ + ∏ + ∏ = . 
In equilibrium with perfect competition and transaction costs conditions (8) and (9)  must be 
satisfied as well as: 
(A1.1) 
C I T A A A + =   
Totally differentiating equations (8) (9) and (A1.1) yields: 
(A1.2)  dt dr dA pf
I I
AA + =  
(A1.3)  dr dA pf
C C
AA =  
(A1.4) 0 = +





































IF renting and land market rent decline with transaction costs. 
Totally differentiating equations (3), (4) and (5) and using equations (8), (9) and (A.1.6) 
yields: 
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IF and landowners lose while CF gains. Total welfare effect is negative. 
Q.E.D. 
 
A2. Imperfect competition and welfare effect of transaction costs 
Part a: this part shows the effect of transaction costs on welfare and profits when there is 
imperfect competition. 



















In equilibrium with imperfect competition and with transaction costs condition (8) and (A1.1) 
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Define transaction costs t








A f f = ), hence from (8), 













* (which is the cost that IF pay above r) exactly matches the murk-up of CF, i.e. t
* 
exactly matches the amount by which CF land marginal value product exceeds the 
equilibrium land market rent r. 












) yields (A1.2) and (A1.4), as well as:   31
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The necessary condition for a maximum for the CF profit function is that its second 















AA pf A pf pf  
IF renting and market rent decreases with the increase of transaction costs. 
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IF and landowners lose, while CF gain if transaction costs increase. 


























Total welfare effect is ambiguous with imperfect competition. The first term on the right hand 










pf A pf pf
pf A
− + 2
, is positive. The second one, 




C pf A  is the amount by which CF land marginal value exceeds in equilibrium the 
land market rent r (see (A2.1) and (A2.2)). With perfect competition, land marginal value 




− = , 
which is the same as given by equation (A1.10) for the perfect competition case. 
Q.E.D. part a. 
 
Part b: this section compares profits and total welfare obtained with imperfect competition 
and transaction costs, relative to profits and total welfare obtained with perfect competition 
and zero transaction costs. 
To show:  
*
0 0 = > <
t
M
t W W ; 
*



















I ;  









In equilibrium with perfect competition and zero transaction costs condition (A1.1) must be 
satisfied as well as: 
(A2.13)  r pf
I
A =  
(A2.14)  r pf
C
A =  





A f f = . 
From equation (A2.3), from imperfect competition and transaction costs equilibrium 
conditions (8), (A2.1), (A1.1), and from perfect competition and zero transaction costs 
equilibrium conditions (A2.13), (A2.14), and (A1.1) it follows that:  
I.  For  t such that t = t








t =  and  
* A A A A
T M
t
T − = − , hence 
*
0




T Q p pQ , where 
) ( ) (




* =  is total output with imperfect competition and 




T Q  is total output with perfect competition and zero 












A pf pf ≠  leading to output fall. 
II.  For any t such that 0 < t < t
* (t > t









A pf pf > ) implying 
* A A
M
t < , 
* A A A A
T M
t




t > , 
* A A A A
T M
t
T − < − ), hence 
*
0 0




T Q p Q p . Land allocation 
equilibrium with higher total output can be found. 
III.  Total transaction costs for t equal to ( )t A A
M
t
T − .  
From I, II, and III it follows that for any t, total welfare with imperfect competition and 
transaction costs is lower relative to total welfare with perfect competition and zero 
transaction costs, 
*
0 0 = > <
t
M




0 = = =
t
T






t − − =
> > 0 0 . 
 
CF gain with imperfect competition and transaction costs relative to the perfect competition 
and zero transaction costs equilibrium: 
First, imperfect competitive behavior of CF implies 
*




C  otherwise behaving as a 
dominant player in the land market is not an optimal choice for CF. Second, with imperfect 





; this follows from 
equation (A2.9), hence 
*






C .  
In equilibrium with imperfect competition and transaction costs, CF gain relative to the 
perfect competition and zero transaction costs equilibrium.    34
 
IF gains/losses 
From equation (A2.3), from imperfect competition equilibrium and transaction costs 
conditions (8), (A2.1), (A1.1), and from perfect competition and zero transaction costs 
equilibrium conditions (A2.13), (A2.14), and (A1.1) it follows that:  
IV.  For any t such that 
* 0 t t ≤ <  it follows that in equilibrium with imperfect competition, 
*
0 0







A pf f p  implying, 
* A A A A
T M
t
T − ≥ −  hence 
* r t r
M
t ≤ + , yielding 
*
0 0




I . With imperfect competition and transaction costs t, such that 
* 0 t t ≤ <  IF gain relative to the perfect competition and zero transaction costs 
equilibrium, because they have lower rental costs and rent more land. 
V.  For any t such that 
* t t >  it follows that in equilibrium with imperfect competition, 
*
0







A f p pf  implying 
* A A A A
T M
t
T − < − , hence 
* r t r
M
t > + , yielding 
*
0




I . With imperfect competition and transaction costs t, such that t > t
* IF 
lose relative to the perfect competition and zero transaction costs equilibrium because 
they pay higher rental costs and rent less land. 
 
Landowners lose with imperfect competition and transaction costs relative to the perfect 
competition and zero transaction costs equilibrium: 
From imperfect competition equilibrium and transaction costs conditions (8), (A2.1), (A1.1), 
and from perfect competition and zero transaction costs equilibrium conditions (A2.13), 
(A2.14), and (A1.1) it follows that 
* r r
M
t < , hence 
*


















Q.E.D. part b.   35
 
A3. Welfare and land productivity with partial reform 












t t 0 * = > <> γ γ  
 
Part a: 




The total welfare effect is ambiguous. 
From equations  ( )
I I I I A t r A pf + − = ∏ ) ( ,  
C C C C rA A pf − = ∏ ) ( , 
T L rA = ∏ , 
L C I W ∏ + ∏ + ∏ =  it follows: 
(A3.1) 
I T I C C I I tA pQ tA A pf A pf W − = − + = ) ( ) (  
When transaction costs are altered, total welfare is affected through 1) change in total output 
value (
T pQ ) and 2) through the change in the level transaction costs incurred (
I tA ). 
Totally differentiating 
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From equation (A2.5) and from I and II in appendix A2 part b, it follows that for any t such 
that 








A pf pf ≤ , respectively, hence  

























0 * 0 = ≤ < >    36
The partial reform that eliminates only transaction costs (for 
* 0 t t ≤ < ) causes total output 
decline. 
Equation (A3.4) implies that the effect of the removal of transaction costs t, such that 
* 0 t t ≤ < , on welfare is ambiguous: 
(A3.5)  0










T tA pQ pQ < −
= ≤ < 0 * 0  
(A3.6)  0










T tA pQ pQ > −
= ≤ < 0 * 0  
The term 
I tA  (given by area GK in figure 3 for transaction costs t
*) represents transaction 






0 * 0 = ≤ < −  (given by area BE in figure 3 for transaction costs 
t
*) represents output loss resulted from the removal of transaction costs. 
From equation (A2.5) and from II in appendix A2 part b, it follows that for any t such that 
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* * = > <  
The partial reform that elimination transaction costs t (for 
* t t > ) to t
* increases total output. 
From equation (A3.8) and from equations (A3.4) - (A3.6) it implies that the effect of the 
removal of transaction costs t (for 
* t t > ) on welfare is ambiguous: 
(A3.9)  0
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* * 0 * > = = = − + > −    37
The term 
I tA  (given by area DK in figure 7 for transaction costs t2) represents transaction 






* * > = −  (given by area C in figure 7 for transaction costs t2) 
represents output gain caused by the reduction of transaction costs from t to t






0 * = = −  (given by area B in figure 7 for transaction costs t2) represents output loss 
caused by the reduction of transaction costs from t
* to t = 0 
Q.E.D. part a. 
 
Part b: 
From equation (A3.4), it follows that for any t such that 






















≤ < = > = γ γ  
Land productivity is larger with positive transaction costs, such that 
* 0 t t ≤ < , than with zero 
transaction costs. 
From equation (A3.4) and (A3.8), it follows that for any t such that 
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* *  is land productivity gain caused by the reduction of 
transaction costs from t to t

























* 0  
represents land productivity loss caused by the reduction of transaction costs from t
* to t =0. 
The land productivity may increase or may decreases with the removal of transaction costs t, 
for 
* t t > . 
Q.E.D. part b.   39
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Farm structures in transition countries 
  Individual farms  Corporate farms 










Albania*  96    4    1998 
Bulgaria  44  1  55  861  1997 
Czech Republic  28  20  72  937  2003 
Hungary  59  4  41  312  2000 
Poland  87  8  13    2003 
Romania  55  2  45  274  2002 
Slovakia  12  42  88  1185  2003 
Slovenia  94    6    2000 
CEECs   59    41     
Estonia  63  2  37  327  2001 
Latvia  90  12  10  297  2001 
Lithuania  89  4  11  483  2003 
Baltic States   81    19     
Armenia  100  1      1999 
Azerbaijan  9    91    1997 
Belarus  12  1  88  3 130  2000 
Georgia  66  1  34  100  2000 
Kazakhstan  29  15  71  11 248  2000 
Kyrgyzstan   23    77    1997 
Moldavia  49    51    2003 
Russia  14    86  5 400  2000 
Tajikistan  7    93    1997 
Turkmenistan  0.3    99.7    1997 
Uzbekistan  4    96    1997 
Ukraine  41    59    2004 
CIS   30    77     
Sources: Bulgaria: Bulgarian Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; Czech Republic: Czech Statistical Office; 
Estonia: Statistical Office of Estonia; Hungary: European Commission; Poland: Central Statistical Office; 
Latvia: Statistical Office of Latvia; Lithuania: Statistical Office of Lithuania; Slovenia: Statistical Office of the 
Republic of Slovenia;  Moldova: Lerman and Sutton (2006); Russia: Koester (2003); Ukraine: Lerman and 
Sedik (2007); Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan: FAO (2002); Azerbaijan,  Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan: Lerman, Csaki, and Feder (2002); Albania: Albanian Ministry of Agriculture; 
Slovakia: Ministry of Agriculture; Romania: Romanian National Institute of Statistics. 
 
Notes: 
TAA – Total Agricultural Area 
* for arable land only 
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Table 2. Land rents in the Czech Republic and Slovakia  
(the value of rents are in local currencies) 






       
Czech Republic       
Average 1999  718  346  208 
by region       
   Corn growing region  1330  597  223 
   Sugar beet growing region  846  731  116 
   Potato growing region  447  174  257 
   Potato-oats growing region  761  158  482 
   Mountain growing region  205  68  301 
Average 2003  875  660  133 
Average 2004  944  759  124 
       
Slovakia       
2001  795  242  329 
2002  816  333  245 
2003  732  393  186 
2004  845  498  170 
2005  923  638  145 
 
Source: Czech Ministry of Agriculture; Research Institute of Agricultural Economics.   44
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Figure 3. Effect of transaction costs t
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Figure 5. Effect of transaction costs reduction on output and welfare with imperfect 






















































































Figure 6. Effect of transaction costs reduction on output and welfare with imperfect 



























































































Figure 7. Effect of transaction costs elimination on output and welfare with imperfect 
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Figure 8. The effect of land demand elasticities on output loss (shown in % change of 
total output) induced by the reduction of initial transaction costs t
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Figure 9. The effect of land demand elasticities on output gain (shown in % change of 
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Figure 10. Relative farm productivity and total welfare effects of transaction costs 
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Figure 11. Relative farm productivity and the effect of the removal of transaction costs 










0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
Relative CF productivity
% Area B of QT % Area C of QT
























T – total output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 